It is well established that depression is characterized by social and interpersonal difficulties (Brown & Harris, 1978; Joiner & Coyne, 1999; Weissman & Paykel, 1974) .
Depressed individuals are likely to induce negative affect in others (e.g., Coyne et al., 1987; Hokanson & Butler, 1992) and to be rejected by others (e.g., Joiner, Alfano, & Metalsky, 1992 Joiner & Metalsky, 1995) . They also have fewer interactions with others (Gotlib & Lee, 1989) and find these encounters less rewarding than do their nondepressed counterparts (Nezleck, Hampton & Shean, 2000) . A natural response to this is to withdraw socially, which may have the effect of perpetuating the depression (Rippere, 1980) . One approach to understanding the association between depression and impairments in social functioning involves focusing on possible deficits in social understanding on the part of depressed persons 1 . Considerable attention has been paid to how depressed persons respond to facial expressions, the idea being that the ability to identify accurately what another person is feeling enables one to make adaptive adjustments to one's behavior that in turn help to avoid conflict, provide assurance to another, relieve another's distress, and so on (Hess, Kappas, & Scherer, 1988; Salovey & Mayer, 1990 ). This should be rewarding for the interaction partner and thereby help to cement social relations. By the same token, an inability to infer another's emotional state on the basis of that person's facial displays should have negative social consequences, and there is evidence that this is so (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Persad & Polivy, 1993) .
1 Throughout this paper we make no distinction between unipolar and bipolar depression, given that our diagnostic measures only assess severity of depression. It is worth noting that there is evidence that bipolar patients obtain lower scores than controls on measures of mentalizing (Bora, Vahip, Gonul, Akdenix, Alkan, Ogut, Eryavuz, 2005 ; but see also Montag, Ehrlich, Neuhaus, Dziobek, Heekeren, Heinz, & Gallinat, 2010) .
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A parallel approach focuses on the ability of depressed persons to 'mentalize,' or to read other people's mental states. This work has been inspired by research on 'theory of mind' in young children (Baron-Cohen, 1995). One aspect of theory of mind is the ability to infer another person's beliefs and desires on the basis of behavioral information, such as facial display, tone of voice, or body posture. Researchers have focused on the possibility that children and adults with autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs) may be characterized by theory of mind deficits. In this context, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb (2001) developed the "Reading the mind in the eyes" task (hereafter, Eyes Test), intended to reveal subtle differences in mental state decoding ability between people with high functioning ASDs and normal controls. The task consists of 36 photographs of the eye and brow region of human faces. These are presented one at a time, along with four words describing mental states. The task of the respondent is to say which of these four states is being experienced by the person whose eyes are shown. While clearly related to facial-expression recognition tasks, the Eyes Task is qualitatively different in at least two respects. First, the Eyes Test taps a wider range of mental states (e.g., pensive, desire, confused, happy) than facial expression recognition tasks, which focus on emotional states; second, the Eyes Test gives participants less information on which to base their judgments. The Eyes Test is therefore considered to be a more sensitive measure of individuals' 'mentalizing' abilities than traditional facial expression tasks.
With regard to the relationship between mental state decoding and clinical depression, the only published paper on the subject (Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005) reports that depressed individuals have problems with decoding mental (Gur, Erwin, Gur, & Zwil, 1992; Surguladze et al., 2004) .
Based on this research it would be reasonable to infer that dysphoric participantsan intermediate group between non-depressed and clinically depressed participantsmight show a similar, negative relationship between their depression scores and mental decoding ability, especially for those facets of depression that are 'affective' in nature.
However, Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, and Chen (2005) , who studied mental state decoding ability in dysphoric college students, found a positive association between college students' depression scores and their Eyes Test performance. Harkness and colleagues (2005) reported two studies in which they administered the Eyes Test to college students, categorized either as non-dysphoric (BDI score ≤ 12) or as dysphoric (BDI score > 12). In a first study of 46 female students they found that dysphoric students attained a significantly higher Eyes Test mean score than did their non-dysphoric controls. This surprising result was followed up in a second study in which 92 students (males and females) took part. There was again a significant positive association between overall depression scores (as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory, BDI) and performance on the Eyes Test. Harkness and colleagues explained these findings by
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suggesting that dysphoric students might be especially vigilant processors of social information, perhaps motivated by a desire to regain control over their social environment (Weary & Edwards, 1994) (Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & Klerman, 1976) . A parallel pattern is found in normal controls who are categorized into dysphoric and nondysphoric based on their BDI scores (e.g., Sloan, Bradley, Dimoulas, & Lang, 2002) .
Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, which consistently finds that depressed participants do worse than controls on positive and/or neutral items (Gur et al., 1992; Surguladze et al., 2004) but not on negative items, Harkness et al. (2005) found that item valence did not interact with dysphoria; dysphoric students performed better than non-dysphoric students regardless of item valence.
The present research aims to re-examine the relationship between depression/dysphoria and mental state decoding ability. We do this by investigating two samples: a sample of moderately-to-severely depressed students who attended a counseling service (counseling group), which was intended to be broadly equivalent to Lee et al.'s (2005) depressed sample; and a sample of normal college students, who ranged in their depression scores from non-dysphoric to dysphoric (college group). This Mental-state decoding 7 latter group was intended to be equivalent to Harkness et al.'s (2005) Finally, we test the explanation proposed by Lee et al. (2005) for the inconsistency between the findings of Lee et al. (2005) with clinically depressed participants and those of Harkness et al. (2005) with dysphoric participants. Lee et al. (2005) noted that their participants met the DSM-IV criteria for a major depressive episode, whereas those in Harkness et al.'s (2005) study did not. Thus, they argued, the differences in the results between the two samples may have been due to the differences in qualitative aspects of their dysphoria. They supported this claim by reference to the fact that in their study it was the affective symptoms of depression rather than non-affective symptoms that were a better predictor of Eyes Test performance among depressed individuals. They suggested that affective symptoms of depression are especially likely to be associated with a lack of interest in others, and as a consequence clinically depressed individuals are likely to perform less well on mental state decoding tasks such as the Eyes Test.
This argument implies that the negative correlation between affective symptoms and Eyes Test performance will be smaller in non-depressed samples than in severely depressed samples, and that the positive correlation between Eyes Test performance and overall BDI scores in (non-depressed) dysphoric samples observed by Harkness et al. (2005) would be driven by a positive correlation between non-affective symptoms of
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Method

Participants
One hundred and eighty-nine students participated in this study. One hundred and sixteen were undergraduate students studying a range of disciplines; what they had in common was that they were clients of the university's counseling service. Of these, 91 (71 females, 20 males) satisfied our selection criterion of being at least mildly depressed (BDI-II score > 14; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) and were therefore retained for further analysis as 'counseling group'. Their average age was 22.22 years (SD = 5.21). The other 73 (67 females, 5 males, one participant did not provide gender information) were undergraduate students of psychology at the same university who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. These students comprised the college group. Their average age was 19.42 (SD = 1.34).
Materials
Eyes Test. The task consists of 36 black-and-white photographs of the eye region of human faces (revised version; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) . These are presented one at a time, along with four words describing mental states (e.g., aghast, fantasizing, impatient, alarmed). The task of the respondent is to say which of these four states is being experienced by the person whose eyes are shown. For the valence analysis, we categorized the items into positive (4 items: playful, fantasizing, thoughtful, friendly), negative (6 items: upset, worried, regretful, accusing, doubtful, and preoccupied) and neutral (8 items: desire, insisting, uneasy, despondent, preoccupied, cautious, skeptical, Mental-state decoding 9 anticipating), following the classifications proposed by Harkness et al. (2005) and also used by Lee et al. (2005 
Procedure
Participants in both groups took part on a voluntary basis, and it was made clear on the consent form completed before any data were collected that they were free not to respond to any items and that they could withdraw at any stage of the research without incurring any penalty. Participants were asked to complete three measures (BDI-II, HADS, and Eyes Test) and to supply some demographic information. The three measures were administered in a counterbalanced order. Participants also indicated their age, gender, and whether or not English was their first language. In addition to these variables, participants in the counseling group reported their major subject of study.
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The three measures were presented in paper-and-pencil form and participants worked at their own pace. Participants in the college group signed up to take part in the study at one of a designated set of times and completed the battery of questionnaires in small groups. A researcher was present to give instructions, answer any questions, and ensure that participants completed the measures individually, without discussion.
Participants in the counseling group were asked at their initial counseling session whether they would be willing to take part in the research; those who agreed to do so completed the questionnaires in the presence of a researcher who gave instructions and answered any questions.
Results
Preliminary analysis and treatment of outliers
Inspection of BDI-II scores revealed one outlier in the college group with a score more than 3 standard deviations greater than the mean; it was therefore changed to the value of the next highest BDI score plus one. The same procedure was adopted for outliers in the Eyes Test total scores (2 outliers) and the Eyes Test neutral items scores (1 outlier).
Participants in the counseling group were significantly more anxious and depressed (whether indexed by BDI-II or HADS depression scores) than were those in the college group. The relevant means, standard deviations, and t values are shown in Table 1 .
Counseling group
Correlations between BDI-II, HADS, and Eyes Test performance. Correlations among the key measures for counseling group participants are shown in showed that the correlation with BDI-II is still marginally significant, r (87 scores, on the one hand, and scores on the three valence subscales, on the other, using
Fisher r-to-z transformations, we did not find any significant differences. 
Analyses across groups
To examine the relation between depression and mental state decoding in the sample as a whole, we divided BDI scores into three categories (0-12, non-dysphoric, n = 56; 13-29: moderately dysphoric, n = 73; 30 and over, severely dysphoric, n = 32) and ran a one-way ANOVA on the Eyes Test scores of all participants, collapsing across group. This analysis revealed that the overall relation between BDI and Eyes Test scores was significant, F(2, 157) = 3.53, p = .032, η 2 = .043, such that the Eyes Test scores of the non-dysphoric group (M = 28.25, SD = 3.21) were higher than those of moderately dysphoric group (M = 27.30, SD = 3.70), which were in turn higher than those of the severely dysphoric group (M = 26.20, SD = 3.62). Post hoc comparisons showed that the non-dysphoric group differed significantly (p = .028) from the severely dysphoric group.
Finally, we revisited the issue of the role of item valence by computing correlations between depression scores and Eyes Test scores separately for negative, neutral, and positive Eyes Test items. The correlations are shown in Table 4 . There is tendency for depression scores to be significantly and negatively related to performance on the neutral and positive (but not the negative) Eyes Test items. The strength of this relation is marginally significantly greater for neutral items than for negative items (z = 1.88, p = .060, and z = 1.94, p = .052, respectively, for the BDI-II and HADS-D measures). The difference in strength of relation between the positive and negative Eyes
Test items is not statistically significant (z = 1.62, p = .11, and z = 1.18, p = .24, respectively, for the BDI-II and HADS-D).
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We set out to examine the relationship between depression scores (as measured by BDI-II and HADS) and mental state decoding ability in two samples of students: a counseling group consisting of students who were clients of the university's counseling service and were at least moderately depressed (BDI-II > 14); and a college group consisting of students who were not attending the university's counseling service.
For the counseling group, based on Lee et al.'s (2005) results, we anticipated that there would be a negative relationship between affective symptoms of depression and mental state decoding ability. Consistent with their results, we found that Eyes Test performance was better predicted by affective symptoms of depression than by nonaffective symptoms. For the college group we sought to explore whether Harkness et al.'s (2005) finding of a positive relation between depression and mental state decoding ability would be replicated. In contrast to their findings, we observed a negative correlation between mental state decoding ability and depression scores. In addition, we analyzed the sample as a whole, collapsing across counseling and college groups. This analysis also showed that depression symptoms are negatively related to mental state decoding ability, with minimally depressed participants performing significantly better than their severely depressed counterparts.
We also examined whether the relationship between mental state decoding ability and depression scores differed as a function of item valence. Lee et al. (2005) found that valence did not interact with group (non-depressed vs. moderately depressed vs. severely depressed) to affect accuracy on the Eyes Test, whereas Harkness et al. (2005) found that dysphoric participants had scored higher than non-dysphoric participants on all types of items. Both sets of findings contrast with the generally reported finding that depression is associated with a tendency to interpret positive and/or neutral stimuli, but not negative stimuli, in negative terms (e.g., Gur et al., 1992; Murphy et al., 1999; Suslow, Junghanns, & Arolt, 2001) . Our findings are more compatible with this pattern. Although there was no significant difference in the strength of the relation between depression scores and Eyes Test scores as a function of items valence when the counseling and college group data were analyzed separately, there was a trend for the relation to be stronger for neutral than for negative items when the data from both groups were analyzed together. This pattern of relationships could be regarded as reflecting a selective influence of negative affective states on Eyes Test performance, with neutral states being less well recognized due to negative schemas biasing responses to such items, although such an interpretation needs to be treated with caution in view of the fact that the difference in the strength of the correlations did not exceed the conventional threshold for statistical significance.
Finally, we explored whether Lee et al.'s (2005) suggestion that the different relations between depression and mental state decoding ability observed by them and by Harkness et al. (2005) reflect qualitative differences in depression. Their argument suggests that a negative correlation between affective symptoms of depression and mental state decoding should be found for the more severely depressed individuals in the counseling group, but not in the college group; it also suggests that in the college group any non-significant correlation of affective symptoms with mental state decoding ability should be offset by a positive correlation between non-affective symptoms and Eyes Test scores. This is not what our results showed. We found that affective symptoms were a better predictor than non-affective symptoms of Eyes Test performance in both groups.
Thus our results corroborate Lee et al.'s (2005) findings regarding the differential influence of affective and non-affective symptoms on mental state decoding, but not their argument that differences in affective symptoms of depressions between severely depressed and dysphoric individuals can account for the difference between their results and the results reported by Harkness et al. (2005) .
There are several ways in which the present findings are inconsistent with those reported by Harkness et al. (2005) . In trying to account for these inconsistencies, it is worth considering whether sample or procedural differences might have played a role.
Other than nationality (Harkness et al.'s participants were students at a Canadian university and were presumably predominantly of Canadian nationality; those in the current study were students at a British university and all but 8 of those in the college group were British) there are no salient differences between the two samples with respect to mean age, mean BDI score or mean Eyes Test score. One clear procedural difference between the two studies is that Harness et al. used a computerized administration of the Eyes Test in which participants were encouraged to respond quickly as well as accurately, and the Eyes Test items were embedded in a broader set of items in which participants had to select one of four possible adjectives to describe each of 12 pictured animals and to judge whether 12 of the Eyes Test items depicted male or female faces. By contrast, we used paper-and-pencil administration of the Eyes Test, participants were not put under any pressure to respond quickly, and there were no items other than Eyes Test items. These procedural differences are large, yet it seems unlikely that they could account for the inconsistencies between the two sets of findings, because Lee et al. (2005) used a procedure identical to that used by Harkness et al. and Harkness, Jacobson, Duong, and Sabbagh (2010) found that participants with a prior history of clinical depression who responded to a happy-mood induction with a happy mood performed worse on the Eyes Test than did counterparts who were unresponsive to the happy mood induction. However, there was no parallel effect for participants assigned to a sad mood induction condition. Thus participants who were responsive to the sad mood induction did not perform better on the Eyes Test than did participants who were unresponsive. Furthermore, for never-depressed participants, there was also no effect in the sad mood induction condition. So dysphoria as indexed by level of sad mood in the sad mood induction conditions was unrelated to Eyes Test
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Conclusion
We examined the relationship between dysphoria/depression and mental state decoding in a counseling sample and a college sample. The results for the counseling group broadly replicated Lee et al.'s (2005) findings, showing that more seriously depressed participants have impaired mental state decoding and that it is the affective symptoms of depression that are associated with poorer mentalizing ability. However, the results for the college group are inconsistent with Harkness et al.'s (2005) findings, in that there was no evidence that dysphoric participants were characterized by better mental state decoding.
By contrast, we found that mental state decoding ability was impaired in dysphoric college students. 
